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Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator: 
A “Frack-tious” Divide on Statutory 
Immunities and Charter Damages 
Joseph Cheng and Andrew Law* 
I. OVERVIEW 
In Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator,1 the Supreme Court of Canada 
considered whether a statutory immunity provision could bar a plaintiff 
from bringing a claim for Charter2 damages against an administrative 
tribunal, and, if so, whether the provision was itself unconstitutional. 
On these issues, the Court deeply divided. Four justices, led by 
Cromwell J., held that the statutory immunity provision in Alberta’s 
Energy Resources Conservation Act3 barred Ms. Ernst’s claim for Charter 
damages, and that the provision itself was not unconstitutional. Four other 
justices, led by McLachlin C.J.C. and Moldaver and Brown JJ., held that it 
was not plain and obvious that the statutory immunity provision barred the 
claim for Charter damages and in so determining, deemed it unnecessary 
to consider the constitutional issue. The remaining judge, Abella J., wrote a 
separate decision that agreed with Cromwell J. on the issue of whether the 
                                                                                                                       
*  Joseph Cheng is Senior Counsel and Andrew Law is Counsel with the Department of 
Justice Canada, National Litigation Sector (Ontario Regional Office). The views expressed in this 
paper are those of the authors only and do not represent the views of the Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General of Canada, the Department of Justice Canada, or the Government of Canada. The 
authors wish to express their deepest thanks to Elizabeth Koudys, Counsel, Department of Justice 
Canada, for her excellent research and editorial assistance on this paper, and to Michael H. Morris, 
Senior General Counsel, Department of Justice Canada, and Heather MacKinnon, General Counsel, 
Department of Justice Canada for their insights and comments. 
1  [2017] S.C.J. No. 1, 2017 SCC 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ernst”]. 
2  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3  R.S.A. 2000, c. E-10 [hereinafter “ERCA”]. The ERCA was repealed and replaced with 
the Responsible Energy Development Act, S.A. 2012, c. R-17.3, proclaimed June 17, 2013 but the 
ERCA remained the applicable statute in force at the time of the allegations from Ms. Ernst’s Fresh 
Claim: Ernst v. EnCana Corp., [2013] A.J. No. 1045, 2013 ABQB 537, at para. 9 (Alta. Q.B.) 
[hereinafter “Ernst (QB)”]. 
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provision barred Ms. Ernst’s claim, but held that it was inappropriate to 
consider the constitutional question, as this issue was being raised de novo 
before the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In many ways, the divisions on display in Ernst reflect the nature of 
the difficult public law issues before it. Ernst required the Court to 
consider, among other issues, the availability of Charter damages against 
an administrative tribunal, the applicability of statutory immunity 
provisions with respect to constitutional claims, and the appropriateness 
of scrutinizing the constitutional validity of legislation de novo at the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  
To help make sense of the Court’s attempt to grapple with these 
issues, this paper provides an overview of the competing opinions in 
order to answer a basic yet difficult question: what exactly did the Court 
decide? Next, this paper attempts to situate Ernst within larger recent 
debates in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, particularly with respect to 
section 24(1) of the Charter. In doing so, it seeks to address Ernst’s 
practical meaning and, in particular, its broader implications with respect 
to the constitutionality of immunities, both common law and statutory. 
II. BACKGROUND 
1. Ms. Ernst’s Claim Against the Regulator Was Part of a Larger 
Claim Involving EnCana Corporation and the Province of 
Alberta  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ernst involves one aspect of a larger 
civil action that was commenced by Jessica Ernst against three separate 
parties, including the Energy Resources Conservation Board (the 
predecessor to the Alberta Energy Regulator,4 the “Regulator”).  
Ms. Ernst owns land near the hamlet of Rosebud in southern Alberta. 
All of her claims related to allegations that EnCana Corporation had 
damaged her fresh water supply, through fracking and other activities 
near her property. In addition to suing EnCana, Ms. Ernst sued both the 
province of Alberta and the Regulator. 
As against Alberta, Ms. Ernst alleged that the province owed her a 
duty to protect her water supply, and that it failed to adequately respond 
                                                                                                                       
4  At the time of Ms. Ernst’s original claim, the Board was known as the Energy Resources 
Conservation Board. Pursuant to the Responsible Energy Development Act, the Board has been 
succeeded by the Alberta Energy Regulator: see Ernst (QB), id., at para. 9. 
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to her complaints regarding EnCana.5 As against the Regulator, Ms. Ernst 
claimed negligence in respect of its regulation of EnCana. She further 
claimed that the Regulator violated her section 2(b) rights under the 
Charter (freedom of expression) when, from November 2005 to March 
2007, it refused to accept communications from her as it considered her 
prior communications to be of a threatening nature.6  
Ms. Ernst originally commenced her claim in December 2007. She 
amended her claim in both April 2011 and again in February 2012. She 
also filed a Fresh Claim in June 2012.7  
2. The Original Applications to Strike the Claim 
Both the Regulator and Alberta applied in the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench to strike the portions of the Fresh Claim that related to 
them, either in whole or in part.8  
The Regulator argued it was “plain and obvious” that Ernst’s claim in 
negligence could not succeed because as a statutory body, the Regulator 
could not owe Ms. Ernst a private law duty of care.9 With respect to the 
Charter claim, the Regulator argued that Charter protection does not 
extend to situations where there are threats or acts of violence, and 
section 2(b) does not “include the right to an audience.”10 The Regulator 
further argued that Ms. Ernst was out of time for bringing her Charter 
claim.  
Finally, the Regulator argued that, in any event, the immunity 
provision found in section 43 of the Energy Resources Conservation Act 
acted as an absolute bar to the action, including Ms. Ernst’s claim for 
Charter damages. That section provides: 
43. No action or proceeding may be brought against the Board or a 
member of the Board or a person referred to in section 10 or 17(1) in 
respect of any act or thing done purportedly in pursuance of this Act, or 
any Act that the Board administers, the regulations under any of those 
Acts or a decision, order or direction of the Board. 
                                                                                                                       
5  Ernst v. Alberta (Energy Resources Conservation Board), [2014] A.J. No. 975, 2014 
ABCA 285, at para. 2 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Ernst (CA)”]. 
6  Id., at para. 3; Ernst (QB), supra, note 3, at paras. 36-38. 
7  Ernst (QB), id., at para. 4. 
8  Id. 
9  Id., at para. 18. 
10  Id., at paras. 35-37. 
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Alberta’s application was much more limited in scope. It argued that 
various paragraphs or portions of paragraphs in the Claim should have 
been struck as these were “‘frivolous, irrelevant or improper’”.11 
3. The Court of Queen’s Bench Allows the Regulator’s Application 
and Dismisses Alberta’s Application 
Chief Justice Wittmann granted the Regulator’s application to strike 
the portions of the claim relating to it for three reasons: 
1. The Regulator could not owe a duty of care to Ms. Ernst and for that 
reason, it was “plain and obvious” her claims in negligence against 
the Regulator could not succeed.12 
2. Subject to section 43 of the ERCA and any applicable limitations 
period, Ernst’s Charter claim was valid. 
3. However, all of Ms. Ernst’s claims against the Regulator, including 
the Charter claims, were barred by section 43 of the ERCA. 
In considering whether section 43 could apply to Ms. Ernst’s Charter 
claims, Wittmann C.J.Q.B. held that there were strong policy reasons that 
supported this determination. In particular, he cited McLachlin C.J.C.’s 
articulation of countervailing factors against awarding Charter damages 
in Vancouver (City) v. Ward,13 namely the existence of alternative 
remedies and concerns over good governance.14 Moreover, Wittmann 
C.J.Q.B. held that there was a real fear that allowing Charter claims  
to defeat statutory immunity clauses would create an inappropriate 
“end-run” around such clauses:  
The mischief that arises circumventing an otherwise valid immunity 
provision is obvious. Parties would come to the litigation process 
dressed in their Charter clothes whenever possible.15 
Finally, Wittman C.J.Q.B. held that if the constitutional validity of 
section 43 were at issue, a Notice of Constitutional Question should have 
been provided to the Attorneys General of Alberta and Canada. On this 
                                                                                                                       
11  Id., at para. 101. 
12  Ernst v. EnCana Corp., [2014] A.J. No. 1259, 2014 ABQB 672, at paras. 28-29 (Alta. Q.B.). 
13  [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, 2010 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward”]; Ernst (QB), supra, 
note 3, at para. 84. 
14  Ernst (QB), id., at paras. 85-89. 
15  Id., at para. 81. 
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point, he observed that while constitutional notice is a procedural 
requirement, it is necessary to facilitate “full argument of any constitutional 
issues” and is “a matter of procedural fairness” to the relevant Attorneys 
General.16 
Chief Justice Wittmann dismissed Alberta’s application, noting that 
while the pleadings may not have been perfectly drafted, “[n]othing of 
substance” would turn on having Ernst substitute the various 
impugned language in the claim. He went on to note on this point that 
“[t]inkering with pleadings ... is not, in this case, useful to the 
advancement of the action”.17 Alberta does not appear to have 
appealed this determination. 
4. A Unanimous Panel of the Alberta Court of Appeal Affirms the 
Court of Queen’s Bench’s Decision 
Ms. Ernst appealed, and a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal 
dismissed her appeal. The Court upheld Wittman C.J.Q.B.’s 
determinations on negligence, and upheld his determination on section 43 
of the ERCA. At the Court of Appeal, Ms. Ernst did not challenge the 
constitutional validity of section 43.18 
With respect to section 43, the Court held that there was “nothing 
constitutionally illegitimate” about applying statutory immunity 
provisions in the context of Charter claims.19 Citing the same passage 
from Ward setting out the countervailing factors that would render 
section 24(1) damages inappropriate,20 the Court of Appeal noted that 
an effective avenue of redress did exist for Ms. Ernst’s Charter 
complaint — judicial review.21 As a result, the Court concluded that the 
lower court made no reviewable error in striking the claim as against 
the Regulator.22 
                                                                                                                       
16  Id., at para. 89. 
17  Id., at para. 130. 
18  On this point, see Abella J.’s decision where she notes that Ms. Ernst did not challenge 
the constitutional validity of s. 43 at the Court of Appeal and indeed, argued that as such, she did not 
have to file a Notice of Constitutional Question before that court: Ernst, supra, note 1, at para. 124. 
19  Ernst (CA), supra, note 5, at para. 30. 
20  Id., at para. 29, citing Ward, supra, note 13, at paras. 33, 40. 
21  Ernst (CA), id., at para. 30. 
22  Id. 
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5. The Supreme Court Dismisses the Appeal, But Divides Sharply 
Ms. Ernst sought and received leave to appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Canada. The appeal focused solely on issues relating to the 
applicability of section 43.23 On these issues, the Court struggled to 
resolve the key questions before it, namely:  
1. whether a claim for Charter damages should be struck out on the 
basis of a statutory immunity clause; and 
2. if so, whether the statutory immunity clause is itself unconstitutional. 
A majority of five judges — per Cromwell J., writing for a plurality 
of four judges and Abella J., on her own — upheld the lower courts’ 
determination that Ms. Ernst’s Charter claim was barred by section 43 of 
the ERCA. 
But a differently configured majority of five judges — per McLachlin 
C.J.C. and Moldaver and Brown JJ. (the “McLachlin C.J.C. plurality”), 
writing for themselves and for Côté J., and Abella J., writing on her own 
— held that the constitutional issues should be left for another day. 
The ultimate result was that the appeal was dismissed and Ms. Ernst’s 
claims were struck. However, the decision leaves us with no majority 
decision on the question of whether the statutory immunity provision is 
unconstitutional. 
6. A Plurality of Judges Led by Cromwell J. Would Have Upheld 
the Lower Courts’ Decisions 
In his plurality decision, Cromwell J. upheld the Court of Appeal’s 
determination that section 43 barred Ms. Ernst’s claims. 
Justice Cromwell begins his discussion by setting out section 43, his 
underscoring of certain passages emphasizing the broad and encompassing 
nature of the provision: “No action or proceeding may be brought against 
the Board … in respect of any act or thing done purportedly in pursuance 
of this Act … or a decision, order or direction of the Board.”24 Justice 
Cromwell observed that there was “virtually no argument” regarding the 
correct statutory interpretation of section 43, because it was “common 
                                                                                                                       
23  Ernst, supra, note 1, at para. 8. 
24  Id., at para. 9 (emphasis in original). 
(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) IMMUNITIES AND CHARTER DAMAGES 187 
ground between the parties” that “on its face”, the provision barred 
Ms. Ernst’s claim for Charter damages.25 
He went further, stating that it “was not open to the Court”26 to 
conclude, as the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality did, that it was not plain and 
obvious that section 43 barred the claim. Justice Cromwell made this 
determination for two key reasons: 
1. Ernst’s position, at all levels of court (including before the Supreme 
Court), was that the immunity clause formed a complete bar to her 
claim.27 To reach a different conclusion would be unfair to the Board, 
which would be deprived of the opportunity to make submissions on 
the issue;28 and 
2. to determine that it was not plain and obvious that the provision 
applied would cast doubt on the scope of all immunity provisions, a 
result that would be “unnecessary, undesirable and unjustified.”29 
Having found that the immunity provision barred the Charter claim, 
the only question left, in Cromwell J.’s opinion, was whether section 43 
was, as Ms. Ernst claimed, constitutionally invalid. If valid, then the 
clause would apply as a complete bar. 
On this point, Cromwell J. expressly considered the merits of the 
Charter claim, even though they had been raised for the first time before 
the Supreme Court. In so doing, he rejected the McLachlin C.J.C. 
plurality’s suggestion (which was also adopted by Abella J.) that the 
Court ought not to conduct a constitutional review on the basis of an 
inadequate record. Justice Cromwell pointed out that if the record were 
inadequate, the appropriate result would also be to dismiss the 
constitutional challenge.30 
Applying Ward,31 Cromwell J. concluded that Charter damages would 
never be an appropriate remedy against the Regulator. Here, he focused 
on Ward’s identification of two countervailing factors that may weigh 
                                                                                                                       
25  Id., at para. 10. 
26  Id., at para. 11. 
27  Justice Cromwell does, however, agree that the Court is not bound by the legal 
submissions made by the parties before it, citing R. v. Sappier, [2006] S.C.J. No. 54, 2006 SCC 54, 
at para. 62 (S.C.C.); Ernst, id., at para. 15. 
28  Ernst, id., at para. 16. 
29  Id., at para. 17. 
30  Id., at paras. 20-23, pointing out that there is a presumption of constitutional validity and 
it is the Charter applicant who bears the burden of demonstrating that an impugned law is 
unconstitutional. 
31  Supra, note 13. 
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against the award of damages in the Charter context: “where there is an 
effective alternative remedy or where damages would be contrary to the 
demands of good governance.”32  
In Ms. Ernst’s case, both of these factors, together with the concern 
over undermining the purpose of the statutory provision, inexorably led 
Cromwell J. to the conclusion that damages would not be an appropriate 
and just remedy for any Charter breaches found against the Regulator.33  
In Cromwell J.’s view, the availability of judicial review was important 
for two reasons. First, judicial review is meant to provide substantial, 
effective and timely Charter relief. Second, the availability of judicial 
review distinguishes this case from others in which the Court has crafted an 
elevated liability threshold in preference to a complete immunity.34 
With respect to good governance concerns, Cromwell J. noted that 
concerns taken from the law of proximity in negligence are apposite. 
Allowing claimants to bring claims for damages against the Board would 
have the potential of depleting the Board’s resources, resulting in 
“defensive actions” that would chill the Board’s ability to carry out its 
statutory duties effectively. Moreover, immunity from civil claims for 
quasi-judicial and regulatory decision-makers ensures that the Board is 
free from interference and able to make fair and effective decisions 
without the distraction of litigation.35 
Finally, Cromwell J. held that it would not be proper to have the 
Court conduct a case-by-case analysis of whether the particular claim for 
Charter damages was, or was not covered by the immunity provision.  
In his view, it would frustrate the purpose of immunity clauses if a mere 
pleading of an allegation could call into question a decision-maker’s 
conduct for which she would otherwise be immune.36  
7. A Separate Plurality Led by McLachlin C.J.C. and Moldaver 
and Brown JJ. Would Have Allowed the Appeal 
The McLachlin C.J.C. plurality disagreed sharply with Cromwell J. 
on both issues. The plurality would have allowed the appeal for the 
reason that it was not plain and obvious that the statutory immunity 
provision barred the Charter claims.  
                                                                                                                       
32  Ernst, supra, note 1, at para. 26 (emphasis added). 
33  Id., at para. 31. 
34  Id., at paras. 34-38. 
35  Id., at para. 47. 
36  Id., at paras. 56-57. 
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In their view, Cromwell J. conducted the analysis in reverse. The 
McLachlin C.J.C. plurality held that the appropriate template for 
assessing these issues is to determine: 
1. first, whether it is plain and obvious that Charter damages could not 
be an appropriate and just remedy; and 
2. if so, whether “it is plain and obvious that the immunity clause, on its 
face, applies to [the plaintiff’s] claim for Charter damages.”  
Only if both of these conditions had been satisfied would the McLachlin 
C.J.C. plurality have struck the claim.37 
Applying the framework from Ward, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality 
concluded that it was not plain and obvious that Charter damages were 
an inappropriate or unjust remedy. On the first step of the Ward 
framework, they held that Ms. Ernst had properly pleaded her Charter 
claim, i.e., that there were pleaded facts which, assumed to be true, could 
sustain a Charter breach. The Regulator had told Ernst to stop expressing 
herself to the media, to the public and prevented her from participating in 
the Board’s public complaints process. According to the McLachlin 
C.J.C. plurality, both of these elements were sufficient for the section 2(b) 
claim to survive a motion to strike.38 
On the second step, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality assessed the 
question of whether damages could fulfil one or more of the functions of 
compensation, vindication or deterrence as articulated in Ward. On this 
point, they held that Ms. Ernst had pleaded that “the Board’s actions 
were punitive, arbitrary and retaliatory”, which is sufficient to establish 
the functions of deterrence and vindication.39 
On the fourth step of the Ward analysis, whether the quantum of 
damages is appropriate and just, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality held that 
this issue was best left for trial.40 
The McLachlin C.J.C. plurality then moved on to consider the third 
step of the Ward analysis, whether there were countervailing 
considerations that make it plain and obvious that Charter damages would 
not be appropriate and just. The plurality’s reasons on this point constitute 
the bulk of its decision, as this was the definitive factor that led Cromwell J. 
to dismiss the appeal.  
                                                                                                                       
37  Id., at para. 149. 
38  Id., at paras. 158-159. 
39  Id., at paras. 160-161. 
40  Id., at para. 162. 
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On these points, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality disagreed that the 
availability of judicial review or concerns over good governance were 
sufficient to conclude that Charter damages were not available here. 
With respect to alternative remedies, they held that judicial review 
would not achieve the same objectives as Charter damages, namely, 
vindication of Charter rights and deterring future breaches. They noted, 
moreover, that damages are not generally available as a remedy in 
judicial review.41  
With respect to good governance concerns, the McLachlin C.J.C. 
plurality found that judicial and quasi-judicial immunity from liability may 
constitute a compelling countervailing factor in some cases. The plurality 
notes, however, that the Regulator was not acting in its adjudicative 
capacity when it barred further communications with Ms. Ernst.42 On this 
point, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality found that Cromwell J.’s decision 
recognized too “broad” and “sweeping” an immunity for the Regulator:43 
“Never has this Court held, simply because a governmental decision-
maker has an adjudicative role — or a prosecutorial role, or a ministerial 
role — that Charter damages can never be an appropriate and just remedy, 
regardless of the circumstances.”44  
On a related note, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality did not agree that 
concerns underlying the limitation of public authority liability in 
negligence (i.e., excessive demands on resources, chilling effect on 
fulfilling statutory duties and protection of quasi-judicial decision-
making) are dispositive in the Charter context.  
For these reasons, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality would not have 
struck the claim against the Regulator as it was not plain and obvious 
that section 43 is a complete bar to Ms. Ernst’s Charter claim. They held 
that it was arguable that punitive acts by the Board fall outside the scope 
of the immunity clause. While this position was not pursued by any party 
on the appeal, the plurality notes that the Court is not bound by the 
positions taken by the parties.  
Moving on to the second step of the analysis, the McLachlin C.J.C. 
plurality held that it was not necessary nor desirable to consider the 
constitutional validity of section 43. First, given their finding that it was 
not plain and obvious that the Charter claim could not proceed, it was 
                                                                                                                       
41  Id., at paras. 166-167. 
42  Id., at paras. 168-175. 
43  Id., at para. 177. 
44  Id., at para. 176. 
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unnecessary to consider the constitutional issue. Second, they agreed that 
the record before the Court was not adequate to consider this issue.45 
Finally, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality indicated that had a court 
eventually agreed that section 43 barred Ms. Ernst’s claim, it would then 
be open to her to seek to have the provision declared unconstitutional. 
At that point, the necessary Notice of Constitutional Question would 
need to be provided to the Attorneys General.46 
8. Justice Abella Casts the Deciding Vote in Favour of Dismissing 
the Appeal 
In a separate decision concurring with Cromwell J. in the result, 
Abella J. held that the statutory immunity provision applied to bar the 
claim. However, unlike Cromwell J., Abella J. held that it would be 
inappropriate to consider the constitutional question as no Notice of 
Constitutional Question had been filed. 
Like Cromwell J., Abella J. held that the immunity contained in 
section 43 was clear and unqualified, thus forming a complete bar to 
Ernst’s claim.47 Justice Abella agreed that unless the clause were found to 
be invalid, the lower courts were correct in striking out the claims against 
the Regulator. 
Having made this determination, Abella J. then dedicated the bulk of 
her reasons to address why it would be inappropriate to determine the 
constitutional issue, focusing in particular on the importance of Notices 
of Constitutional Question. On this point, she noted that Notices of 
Constitutional Question serve a “‘vital purpose’” by ensuring both that 
courts have a full evidentiary record before invalidating legislation and 
that governments are given the fullest opportunity to support the validity 
of legislation.48 
Citing Guindon v. Canada,49 Abella J. held that there was no basis to 
allow Ms. Ernst to raise a new Charter issue for the first time at the 
Supreme Court.50 She observed that the public interest requires that the 
fullest and best evidence be put before the Court when it is asked to 
decide constitutional issues. This requires participation of the appropriate 
                                                                                                                       
45  Id., at para. 189. 
46  Id., at para. 190. 
47  Id., at paras. 70-72. 
48  Id., at para. 99. 
49  [2015] S.C.J. No. 41, 2015 SCC 41 (S.C.C.). 
50  Ernst, supra, note 1, at para. 99. 
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Attorneys General. In this case, the Attorney General of Alberta was 
prevented from offering justificatory evidence for the Court’s 
consideration.51 
In this case in particular, Abella J. noted that Ms. Ernst’s attack on the 
statutory immunity provision would have profound implications for 
judicial and quasi-judicial decision-makers who are protected by 
statutory and common law immunities. These immunities protect 
decision-makers’ independence and impartiality and thereby facilitate the 
administration of justice. For this reason, the Supreme Court has 
accepted that regulatory boards are immune from negligence claims that 
arise from policy decisions.52 
Interestingly, Abella J. opined that in her view, the Ward analysis 
would likely have led to the same conclusion that Cromwell J. reached: 
that Charter damages would likely not have been found to be an 
“appropriate and just” remedy in Ms. Ernst’s case. Further, Abella J. 
agreed with Cromwell J. that judicial review would have been the 
appropriate procedure for challenging the Regulator’s actions.53 
Ultimately, however, Abella J. emphasized that the question of whether 
Charter damages could be an appropriate remedy requires a proper 
consideration of the constitutionality of the immunity provision.54 On this 
point, Abella J. concluded her decision by taking Ms. Ernst to task for 
essentially advancing a new, contrary argument on the constitutional issue 
in the Supreme Court. Contrary to previous positions taken in the lower 
courts, Ms. Ernst explicitly challenged the constitutional validity of section 
43 for the first time at the Supreme Court. As Abella J. noted, Ms. Ernst 
did not provide proper notice to do so.55  
Justice Abella commented that if permitted, such conduct would allow 
an applicant to deprive the relevant Attorneys General and other parties 
of the ability to meaningfully participate in the proceeding. Such conduct 
in breach of the requirements of the jurisprudence and the governing 
statutes, “should not be rewarded in this Court with redemptive 
forgiveness.”56  
                                                                                                                       
51  Id., at para. 111. 
52  Id., at para. 118. 
53  Id., at paras. 123-127. 
54  Id., at para. 123. 
55  Id., at para. 124. 
56  Id., at para. 125. 
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9. Why Was the Court So Divided in Ernst? 
By a narrow 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court in Ernst confirmed that 
the statutory immunity provision in section 43 of the ERCA barred all of 
Ms. Ernst’s claims, including those under the Charter. A different 5-4 
majority, however, refused to consider the issue of whether the provision 
was itself unconstitutional.  
Fortunately, decisions from the Supreme Court that are as deeply split 
as Ernst are rare.57 Not surprisingly, however, the decision and its 
perceived lack of clarity from the Court has attracted a fair amount of 
critical commentary.58  
So why did the Court divide so deeply? At first blush, many of the 
principles discussed in the various opinions are not new, but represent 
re-articulations of settled principles in public law. These include:  
 The unwillingness to decide constitutional cases in a factual vacuum: 
From its earliest jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has held that 
Charter cases should not be decided on the basis of an inadequate 
factual record. The majority’s refusal to decide the constitutional 
issue, particularly since it was raised in explicit fashion for the first 
time at the Supreme Court, is consistent with settled jurisprudence on 
this point.59 
 Primacy of judicial review: Recent jurisprudence from the Supreme 
Court has generally affirmed that where judicial review is available, 
                                                                                                                       
57  For example, similarly split decisions in constitutional cases have occurred in Chaoulli v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 2005 SCC 35 (S.C.C.)  
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personnel professional et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 
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58  See, for example, Dean Lorne Sossin, “Damaging the Charter: Ernst v. Alberta Energy 
Regulator” (January 20, 2012), online: <thecourt.ca> [hereinafter “Sossin”]; Matthew Lewans, 
“Damages for Unconstitutional Administrative Action? A Comment on Ernst v. Alberta Energy 
Regulator” (2017) 30 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 379 [hereinafter “Lewans”]; Julia Kindrachuk, 
“Statutory Immunity from Charter Damages: Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator” (2015) 78 Sask. L. 
Rev. 379 [hereinafter “Kindrachuk”]. 
59  See MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at 361-62 (S.C.C.); 
Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No. 92, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at 1099-1101 
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all issues, including constitutional issues, should be raised first in 
this context.60  
 Administrative bodies must be able to control their own processes: 
The good governance concern identified by Cromwell J. aligns with 
the general principle that adjudicative bodies must be able to control 
their own processes. A corollary to this is that, similar to courts, they 
must also be able to operate without undue fear of litigation.61 
Despite this, the decision in Ernst is also reflective of a larger 
ongoing debate in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the 
availability of damages under section 24(1) of the Charter. In this regard, 
there is a clear doctrinal tension as between Cromwell J.’s acceptance 
that Charter damages would never be an appropriate remedy against the 
Board and McLachlin C.J.C.’s case-specific application of the Ward 
framework. In our view, it is this larger debate that goes some way 
towards explaining why the Court split as it did in Ernst. 
10. Situating Ernst Within the Court’s Section 24(1) Jurisprudence  
One of the more compelling struggles in Ernst is its failure to provide 
a substantive holding on arguably the most interesting issue before the 
Court, namely, whether an immunity clause like section 43 of the ERCA 
is contrary to the Charter.  
The arguments made by Ms. Ernst and others was that section 24(1) 
enshrines the right of a successful claimant to an appropriate Charter 
remedy. Any limitation on the availability of such a remedy would 
therefore be inconsistent with the Charter and of no force or effect.62 This 
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No. 9, 2008 SCC 9, at paras. 27, 48-49, 54 (S.C.C.). 
62  Kindrachuk, supra, note 58. 
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proposition flows from the basic principle of constitutional supremacy: the 
Crown cannot immunize itself from effective constitutional relief by mere 
grant of statutory immunity.  
However, it is recognized that the discretion afforded to courts under 
section 24(1) of the Charter is not absolute. The jurisprudence recognizes 
numerous constitutionally valid qualifications that structure and limit the 
exercise of section 24(1) powers.63  
The limitations that have been placed upon section 24(1) generally 
fall within three categories: (1) textual limitations imposed by the 
requirement that a section 24(1) remedy be appropriate and just in  
the circumstances; (2) limitations arising from concerns relating to 
effective administration of the state; and (3) procedural limitations that 
govern the adjudication of all cases, including claims for Charter relief. 
In our view, it is only when these boundaries of section 24(1) are 
understood that one can undertake a principled assessment of whether a 
statutory grant of Crown immunity is constitutionally invalid. 
(a)  Textual Limitations on Section 24(1) Discretion 
Section 24(1) of the Charter entrenches the judicial discretion to 
provide an individual remedy for the infringement of Charter rights and 
freedoms.64 The section states that: “Anyone whose rights or freedoms, 
as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply 
to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court 
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.” 
It is widely acknowledged that section 24(1) confers upon courts the 
broadest of remedial authority. As McIntyre J. observed in R. v. Mills,65 
“[i]t is difficult to imagine language which could give the court a wider 
and less fettered discretion.”66 Moreover, like all provisions of  
the Charter, section 24(1) is to be given a generous and expansive 
interpretation: narrow, technical or legalistic approaches are to be 
avoided.67  
                                                                                                                       
63  Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016), at 
ch. 40.2(g) [hereinafter “Hogg”]. 
64  Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, 2003 
SCC 62, at para. 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doucet-Boudreau”]. 
65  [1986] S.C.J. No. 39, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mills”]. 
66  Id., at 965. 
67  Doucet-Boudreau, supra, note 64, at paras. 23-24; Ontario v. 974649 Ontario Inc., 
[2001] S.C.J. No. 79, 2001 SCC 81, at para. 18 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunedin”]. 
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At the same time, the discretion afforded by section 24(1) is not 
unconstrained. There are textual limitations arising from the requirement 
that a Charter remedy be appropriate and just in the circumstances.  
In interpreting this requirement, courts have developed certain broad 
principles to guide the exercise of section 24(1) discretion. For instance, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that an appropriate and just remedy is 
one that is responsive to the facts and circumstances of a violation, such 
that the remedy meaningfully vindicates the rights and freedoms of the 
claimant.68  
At the same time, an appropriate and just remedy must also be fair to 
the party against which it is imposed. In this regard, the remedy should 
not result in substantial hardships that are unrelated to securing the right 
at issue.69 The costs and practicalities, including the availability of 
financial resources and competing demands on the public purse, are 
therefore relevant considerations in assessing whether a remedy meets 
the textual requirements of section 24(1).70 
The identification of an appropriate and just remedy is also guided by 
constitutional constraints on the role of the judiciary. As the Supreme 
Court has recognized, section 24(1) is not an invitation for courts to 
intrude upon legislative powers or to erase distinctions between branches 
of government.71 With this in mind, it has been cautioned that an 
appropriate and just remedy is one that is respectful of basic 
constitutional principles, such as the separation of powers, and that does 
not involve the courts in non-adjudicative functions, such as policy-
making, that are beyond the expertise of the judiciary.72 In crafting a 
Charter remedy, therefore, courts must also be sensitive to their 
constitutional role, avoiding remedies that unduly entrench upon the 
powers of other branches of government.73  
As well, in Ward, the Supreme Court set out a new, functional 
approach that governs awards of monetary damages under section 24(1). 
Under this approach, damages are an appropriate and just remedy only 
where monetary compensation serves a useful function by furthering the 
general objects of the Charter.74 This will be the case where monetary 
                                                                                                                       
68  Ward, supra, note 13, at para. 19; Doucet-Boudreau, id., at para. 55. 
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73  Id., at paras. 34, 56. 
74  Ward, supra, note 13, at paras. 24-25. 
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damages serve the purpose of: (i) compensating the claimant for losses 
caused by the Charter breach; (ii) vindicating constitutional values; 
and/or (iii) deterring against future breaches.75 As the Court held, 
achieving one or more of these objects is a basic prerequisite that must be 
satisfied before damages will be an appropriate exercise of section 24(1) 
discretion.  
Importantly, these limitations on section 24(1) do not arise by statute. 
They are, rather, imposed by the language of the provision, namely the 
requirement that a Charter remedy be appropriate and just in the 
circumstances. Thus, even on a purely textual analysis, the remedial 
discretion under section 24(1) has its limits. Judges must weigh a host of 
competing concerns when fashioning a remedy that is effective for the 
claimant, respectful of limitations on judicial power and, with respect to 
Charter damages, functional.  
(b)  Effective Administration of the State 
When considering whether a Charter remedy meets the “appropriate and 
just” requirement, concerns relating to good governance have weighed 
heavily in the balance. In particular, Canadian courts have shown a clear 
reluctance to impose a Charter remedy that will unduly interfere with the 
effective administration of state functions. This limitation on the availability 
of section 24(1) relief arises from the acknowledgement that the state must 
be afforded some degree of protection from Charter relief, particularly 
where the imposition of liability would impede the government’s policy-
making, legislative and adjudicative functions.76  
The jurisprudence in this area has developed primarily in the area of 
Charter damages. In this context, courts have acknowledged that the 
Crown benefits from some qualified immunities designed to protect 
essential Crown functions from exposure to liability. This stipulation to 
section 24(1) emanates primarily from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance).77 In that case, a 
majority of the Court held that New Brunswick legislation abolishing 
that province’s system of supernumerary judges violated the section 
11(d) guarantee of judicial independence and was therefore 
unconstitutional. Despite this finding of invalidity, the Court refused to 
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order damages on the basis that, absent conduct that is clearly wrong, in 
bad faith or an abuse of power, the Crown enjoys immunity from liability 
for conduct done pursuant to valid legislation.78 For this reason, it is 
generally held that an action for damages under section 24(1) of the 
Charter cannot be combined with an action for declarations of invalidity 
under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.79 
Mackin affirms that some Crown functions are so essential to the 
effective administration of the state that their exercise should be 
unimpeded by exposure to liability, including with respect to Charter 
damages. In that case, for example, the interest deserving of protection 
was the effectiveness and efficiency of governmental administration, 
which would be undermined if duly enacted laws were not given their 
full force and effect as long as they are not declared invalid.80 The 
underlying rationale to this qualified immunity is that the state must be 
afforded a measure of leniency for the free and effective discharge of 
essential Crown functions: 
The Mackin principle recognizes that the state must be afforded some 
immunity from liability in damages resulting from the conduct of certain 
functions that only the state can perform. Legislative and policy-making 
functions are one such area of state activity. The immunity is justified 
because the law does not wish to chill the exercise of policy-making 
discretion.81 
Eight years after Mackin, the Supreme Court’s decision in Ward 
reaffirmed that the requirements of good governance may, in certain 
cases, limit the availability of an award of Charter damages.82 In doing 
so, the Court acknowledged that Mackin is not the only situation in 
which section 24(1) damages should be avoided due to the negative 
impacts that exposure to liability would have on the administration of 
government.83 While the Court did not specifically identify any new 
branches of qualified immunity — leaving it to future courts to define on 
a case-by-case basis — it did acknowledge that “[d]ifferent situations 
may call for different thresholds” and that courts may look to private law 
                                                                                                                       
78  Id., at para. 78. 
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thresholds and defences for guidance in determining whether Charter 
damages are appropriate and just.84 
Since Ward, the Supreme Court has recognized at least one additional 
branch of qualified Crown immunity from Charter damages, namely the 
limited immunity given to prosecutors recognized in Henry v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General).85 Henry brought an action against the 
Crown for Charter damages arising from his false conviction and, 
specifically, for the Crown’s failure to meet its disclosure obligations 
under the Charter. Writing for the majority, Moldaver J. recognized that 
the availability of Charter damages under section 24(1) is not unlimited, 
particularly where the imposition of liability would impede essential 
Crown functions, such as the administration of justice.86 In this regard, 
he agreed that a heightened per se threshold of intentionality is needed to 
protect against “exposing prosecutors to an unprecedented scope of 
liability that would affect the exercise of their vital public function.”87 
Where a Charter claimant fails to plead or prove facts to support a 
finding on this threshold requirement, damages will not be appropriate 
and just as a rule and without consideration of the case-specific 
framework prescribed by Ward.88 By contrast, the Chief Justice and 
Karakatsanis J. declined to recognize any per se immunity from Charter 
damages, finding that concerns regarding good governance should instead 
be considered under the Ward framework on a case-by-case basis.89  
In many ways, Cromwell J.’s decision in Ernst builds on Henry by 
confirming that not every allegation of Charter damages must proceed to 
an individualized, case-by-case consideration of whether Charter 
damages are appropriate and just.90 Rather, the Crown should benefit 
from certain qualified exclusions from Charter damages, designed to 
protect governmental functions from the negative side-effects that would 
result from exposure to Charter liability: 
Underlying the question of whether Charter damages could be an 
appropriate remedy is a broader issue. It concerns how to strike an 
appropriate balance so as to best protect two important pillars of our 
democracy: constitutional rights and effective governments. ... Granting 
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Charter damages may vindicate Charter rights, provide compensation 
and deter future violations. But awarding damages may also inhibit 
effective government, and remedies other than damages may provide 
substantial redress for the claimant without having that sort of broader 
adverse impact. Thus there is a need for balance with respect to the 
choice of remedies.91  
For claims against judges and quasi-judicial decision-makers, this 
balance tips decidedly in favour of immunity from Charter damages. 
As Cromwell J. concludes, the traditional justifications for judicial 
immunity at common law (i.e., to protect the administration of justice 
and judicial independence by permitting decision-makers to make 
decisions free from interference and without distraction or threat of 
litigation) resonate equally in the Charter context.92 Interestingly, 
however, Cromwell J. also relies upon the availability of alternative 
remedies to justify this threshold limitation, perhaps suggesting a 
reversal of the Ward framework in which the complete list of 
countervailing considerations may also be considered at the threshold 
stage to justify qualifications to the availability of Charter damages. 
As these cases show, the appropriate and just requirement also imposes 
internal qualifications to the availability of Charter damages arising from 
concerns regarding the impact that exposure to liability may have on the 
effective administration of the state. Importantly, these qualifications can, in 
certain contexts, be a complete bar to a Charter damages claim. As such, 
these qualifications further define the boundaries of section 24(1) and, in our 
view, must inform any assessment of the constitutionality of any external 
derogation to section 24(1)’s remedial powers.  
(c)  Procedural Limitations 
While the Charter does not prescribe any procedural rules of its own, 
it does not exist in a procedural vacuum. Rather, section 24(1) operates 
concurrently with, and does not replace, procedural rules of general 
application.93 This is to say that constitutional claimants must comply 
with the ordinary rules of practice, procedure, and evidence of the court 
in which their claim is made. This is despite the fact that a failure to 
comply with such rules might defeat an otherwise valid claim and preclude 
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the availability of effective and meaningful relief under section 24(1).94 
Compliance with procedural rules must therefore be understood as  
an intrinsic prerequisite to any appropriate and just remedy under 
section 24(1), rather than an external derogation of the remedial 
jurisdiction given by the section. 
In addition to codes of procedure, there are a number of other 
constitutionally valid procedural qualifications to the availability of 
section 24(1) relief. Statutory limitation periods are one example. As the 
Supreme Court has confirmed, limitation periods of general application are 
applicable to constitutional cases, including claims for personal relief 
under section 24(1).95 In Ravndahl v. Saskatchewan, for example, the 
Court did not question the applicability of Saskatchewan’s limitation 
statute to a claim for personal relief under section 24(1), despite the fact 
that the application of the limitation period had the effect of defeating a 
widow’s equality claim for Charter damages.96 Four years later, in 
Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court 
confirmed that claims for personal remedies can be barred by the running 
of a limitation period.97 In this way, the Supreme Court appears to agree 
that the purpose of limitation periods are as valid in the context of an 
action for Charter damages as for any other type of claim, such that it 
would neither be appropriate nor just to grant a section 24(1) remedy in the 
face of a claimant’s failure to comply with these statutory rules.98  
While the constitutional legitimacy of statutory limitation periods of 
general application is therefore clear, case law suggests that courts may 
question the constitutional validity of short, specialized limitation periods, 
particularly where they have the effect of immunizing the Crown from 
effective constitutional review.99 In Prete v. Ontario, for example, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal held that a six-month limitation period for actions 
against the Crown did not apply to an action for damages under 
section 24(1).100 While this result may conflict with Ravndahl, we agree 
with Hogg et al. that the result is consistent with the proposition, described 
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above, that section 24(1) operates within the existing framework of 
Canadian law. To the extent that a statutory qualification on section 24(1) 
erects a more onerous procedural framework for constitutional claims that 
has the effect of insulating against constitutional review, the validity of 
such a rule is probably suspect.101  
Another constitutionally valid procedural limitation on the availability 
of section 24(1) relief is the statutory requirement that constitutional 
claimants notify Attorneys General of their intention to seek constitutional 
relief. Indeed, the failure of Ms. Ernst to comply with this requirement was 
the basis upon which Abella J. was prepared to dispose of her action. 
This is for good reason. As Abella J. rightly points out, notice requirements 
serve an important purpose, both for governments and courts. With respect 
to the former, governments should be afforded a full opportunity to support 
the constitutionality of their legislation or actions. Regarding the latter, 
notification ensures that courts have a full evidentiary record, including 
justificatory evidence, before invalidating legislation. In light of the 
important function served by notice requirements, there should be no 
doubt that non-compliance is also a constitutionally valid limitation on the 
availability of section 24(1) relief. 
Given that the Charter does not prescribe its own procedural code, it 
is a practical necessity that the existing framework of procedural rules 
apply equally to the adjudication of Charter claims. The existing procedural 
landscape should therefore be regarded as internal to section 24(1), further 
defining the boundaries of what is an appropriate and just Charter 
remedy. Understood in this way, procedural limitations on the availability 
of Charter relief are constitutionally sound insofar as they are rules of 
general application and/or do not have the purpose or effect of insulating 
against effective and meaningful constitutional relief. 
11. A Framework for Assessing the Constitutionality of Statutory 
Immunity 
Certain commentators have questioned the applicability of statutory 
immunity provisions in the section 24(1) context, arguing that this would 
appear inconsistent with the principles of the rule of law and/or 
constitutional supremacy.102 Put another way, should a statutory 
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provision be able to set limits on a claim brought under a constitutional 
provision?  
This question is perhaps not as easily answered as it might first 
appear. As we have illustrated above, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
acknowledges the legitimacy of certain constraints, including statutory 
ones, surrounding the provision of relief under section 24(1). These 
existing limitations provide important context when assessing the 
constitutionality of statutory immunity provisions like section 43 of 
the ERCA. To the extent that an immunity or limitations provision is 
consistent with these recognized constraints on the availability of 
section 24(1) relief, concerns about the rule of law or constitutional 
supremacy should not arise. These provisions may serve an important 
constitutional purpose by flagging those areas in which there is 
legitimate concern that exposure to liability will have an unacceptably 
damaging impact on good governance.  
With respect to limitations on the availability of section 24(1) that go 
beyond those already acknowledged by the jurisprudence, such 
limitations would more easily be regarded as constitutionally inconsistent 
insofar as they have the purpose, or effect, of immunizing against 
effective and meaningful Charter relief. Even where this is the case, 
however, the jurisprudence described above suggests that such 
limitations may still be justified by the Crown. While such justification 
will often arise from concerns regarding good governance, Cromwell J.’s 
decision in Ernst suggests that other factors, such as the availability of 
alternative remedies, may also be considered. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, Ernst is perhaps most likely to be recognized as a 
“stepping stone” decision, as it leaves its most important and 
interesting issue unanswered: whether and in what circumstances a 
statutory immunity provision can bar a claim for Charter damages. This 
is not to say, however, that Ernst is jurisprudentially insignificant. The 
decision lays the groundwork and provides signposts for future cases, 
in particular emphasizing the Court’s need for an adequate factual 
record to consider these issues. The decision also lays bare fundamental 
divisions within the Supreme Court regarding the availability of 
Charter damages, particularly in the face of statutory or common law 
immunities. As one commentator notes, these divisions are reflective of 
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a broader debate regarding the appropriate role, if any, that traditional 
private law immunities should play in governing the availability of 
Charter relief.103 For now, however, Ernst leaves the Court planted in 
the middle, acknowledging both the need for meaningful Charter relief 
while also accommodating the numerous existing, constitutionally 
valid, and reasonable limits on section 24(1). 
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